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The Malleable Nature of Embodied Cues in Judgment and
Behavior
At the core of embodied cognition research is the assumption that higher level processing is
grounded in the organism’s lower level sensory andmotor experiences (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Meier
et al., 2012; Winkielman et al., 2015b). Past research of perceptual multimodal cue integration
has demonstrated that several mechanisms underlie perceptual integration (Treisman and Gelade,
1980; Zmigrod and Hommel, 2013). Based on embodied cognition theory, which indicates that
activation automatically spreads from concepts driven by experiences in the physical world to their
metaphorically-related social concepts (for reviews, Williams et al., 2009; Meier et al., 2012), it was
proposed that to produce action, embodied cues associate between lower level and higher level
cues. However, little is known about the factors that modulate this integration. This gap in the
literature is of relevance because research of embodied cognition has demonstrated that perceptual
symbols can lead to different patterns of activation across different contexts (Barsalou, 2008),
which makes predictions about judgment and behavior difficult. For example, the associations
between physical warmth/coldness and psychological warmth/coldness across different contexts
yielded both assimilative effects (e.g., physical warmth increases psychological warmth) (Williams
and Bargh, 2008) and contrast effects (e.g., physical coldness increases the need for social warmth)
(Zhong and Leonardelli, 2008; Bargh and Shalev, 2012; Shalev and Bargh, 2014; Zhang and Risen,
2014).
Following the recent pragmatic turn in cognitive science, according to which cognitive processes
and their underlying neural activity patterns should be studied primarily with respect to their roles
in action generation (Glenberg et al., 2013), I argue that embodied cues are integrated according
to their momentary functions within each individual’s system of goals. Conceptualized as cognitive
representations of desired end-points that affect evaluations, emotions and behaviors (Fishbach and
Ferguson, 2007), goals serve as reference points toward which behavior is directed. I suggest that
analyzing embodied cue integration from the “motivation as cognition” perspective (Kruglanski
et al., 2002)may add to our understanding of which cues are perceived, what response is determined
as appropriate in a given situation, and why different judgments and behaviors may be elicited by
the activation of similar sets of embodied cues. In the sections below, I will discuss three types of
constraints that stem from the “motivation as cognition” perspective, including the motivational
properties of embodied cue integration (Eitam and Higgins, 2010), the allocational properties of
embodied cue integration (based on attentional resource-limitation, see Kahneman, 1973), and
the structural properties of cognitive-interconnectedness and uniqueness (Kruglanski et al., 2002).
Shalev The architecture of embodied cognition
The three types of constraints, adopted from goal systems theory
(Kruglanski et al., 2002), were invoked to explain the process of
embodied cue integration.
What Is the “Motivation as Cognition”
Perspective?
The “motivation as cognition” perspective assigned distinct
functions to motivational and cognitive variables. A basic
assumption is that motivation can fluctuate from one moment
to the next, thus determining the extent to which any
kind of information (strategic and peripheral; conscious and
unconscious) is processed (Kruglanski and Thompson, 1999).
Mental representations of motivational networks comprise inter-
connected goals and means that may be automatically activated
simultaneously by different cues, and as such, they may
compete with each other for mental resources (Kruglanski et al.,
2002). Likewise, according to this approach, several cognitive
properties set the constraints within which the motivational
properties may express themselves. Because both motivation
and embodied cognition are types of cognition, this set of
cognitive constraints may explain the way motivation influences
embodied cue integration. In the sections below, I will discuss
the constraints on cue integration, including the motivational
properties of embodied cue integration (Eitam and Higgins,
2010), the allocational properties of embodied cue integration
(based on attentional resource-limitation, see Kahneman, 1973),
and the structural properties of cognitive-interconnectedness and
uniqueness (Kruglanski et al., 2002).
The Motivational Properties of Embodied
Cue Integration
The first assumption of embodied cue integration is that
because numerous sensori-motor cues can serve as the material
for multiple social inferences, a selection process is needed
to determine which cues to integrate in a given situation
to create meaning. I suggest that perceptual or conceptual
saliency depends on whether a mental representation reflects
the individual’s momentary goals, and what, if any, relationship
those goals have with the salient cues in the immediate
environment of the individual (Balcetis and Dunning, 2009;
Balcetis et al., 2012). A similar line of thought was suggested by
De Houwer (2009), indicating that associative learning effects
are determined not only by the direct experience of events
but also by prior knowledge and instructions. Pursuing this
logic, Eitam and Higgins (2010) suggest that whether, and the
degree to which, a stimulated mental representation is activated
reflects the relative weights of one or any combination of
three sources of motivational relevance: value relevance, or the
extent to which acting on a mental representation will bring
about desired results and/or prevent undesired results; control
relevance, or the efficacy with which the activated representation
makes things happen; and truth relevance, which establishes
what is real. Thus, the relative extents to which these sources
are relevant to the individual’s needs determines the level
and duration of activation, regardless of the content of the
representation.
Indeed, recent findings of embodied cognition research have
provided strong evidence for the effect of motivational relevance
on cue integration. For example, one study demonstrated the
source of value relevance by showing that the adoption of
approach-type postures (e.g., leaning forward) was associated
with increases in neural activation characteristic of approach
situations (Harmon-Jones et al., 2011). In another study, the
performance of avoidance type movements (pushing a shopping
cart as opposed to holding it) was associated with fewer
reward-oriented consumer choices at the checkout counter (Van
den Bergh et al., 2011). The source of control relevance was
demonstrated by showing that embodied simulations of facial
expressions were expressed for conceptual understanding only if
they were relevant to solving the task at hand (Niedenthal et al.,
2009), indicating that embodiments are not passive byproducts
of conceptual processing (Winkielman et al., 2015a). Finally,
the source of truth relevance was shown in a study where
participants were asked to verify or deny that a certain object
has a certain property (i.e., answer a question such as “Do cats
have wings?”). The results showed that the speed of property
verification was related to the perceptual salience of the feature in
question (Solomon and Barsalou, 2004). For example, property
verification was quicker the more conspicuous the property,
presumably because such properties are easier to see in a recalled
or simulated visual representation.
The Allocation Properties of Embodied Cue
Integration
The second assumption of embodied cue integration is that
the fundamental allocation property relies on limited mental
resources. From that perspective, the allocation of cognitive
resources has a functional purpose, namely, to minimize the
extent to which mental resources are exploited in the creation
of unified percepts. The property of limited resources is
demonstrated, for instance, by motor fluency effects observed
only when individuals are involved in monitoring situational
constraints. For example, research showed that compared
with rigid right-handers, flexible right-handers recalled product
orientations better and showed a preference for objects on which
the handle was oriented in the direction of the hand used for
grasping (Eelen et al., 2013).
Another application for the limited resources effect is
demonstrated by the switching cost entailed in shifting attention
from one modality to another (e.g., from audition to vision),
indicating that the second stimulus is processed more slowly
than it would have been had the two stimuli used the same
modality (e.g., Spence et al., 2001). The switching cost was also
demonstrated by the perceptual simulation approach, indicating
that verifying the properties of concepts in the auditory modality
was slower after verifying a property in a different modality than
after verifying one in the same modality (Pecher et al., 2003).
The limited resources assumption has several consequences.
First, I suggest that the integration process is fundamentally
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economic and that it operates automatically by activating samples
of the interconnection between sounds, sights, and other sensory
signals that were encoded in memory based on previous learning
(Brunel et al., 2009; Zmigrod et al., 2009; Bargh and Morsella,
2010; Vallet et al., 2010). Evidence for automatic activation is
based on the ideomotor theory, which assumes the existence
of an automatic action–effect integration mechanism that binds
motor patterns and action effect representation (Chartrand
and Bargh, 1999; Zmigrod and Hommel, 2013). Second, as
was recently proposed by Winkielman et al. (2015b), I argue
that non conscious automatic signals, including fluency and a
sense of coherence, inform fundamental cognitive and social
judgments (Winkielman and Schooler, 2011; Schwarz, 2015),
thereby consuming fewer cognitive resources.
The Structural Properties of Embodied Cue
Integration
The third assumption of embodied cue integration is that
unified percept configurations are influenced by sensori-motor
cue interconnections, including the form and associative strength
of those interconnections. The strength of association between
multi-modal units is positively related to the uniqueness of the
interconnections (Kruglanski et al., 2002).
This dynamic helps explain why specific embodied metaphors
have stronger associative links than other metaphors with
sensori-motor cues. A possible explanation could be that the
repetition of specific social inferences across different contexts
in response to sensori-motor contextual cues occurs when the
strength of the association is high or in populations where this
motivation is accessible. For example, evidence that washing
one’s hands also “washes away” feelings of guilt was found
not only in a normal population (Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006;
Lee and Schwarz, 2010, 2011), but also among patients with
obsessive compulsive disorder in whom the association between
contents related to physical and psychological cleanliness is
stronger (Reuven et al., 2014). Likewise, research indicates
that core metaphors (e.g., temperature, distance) are associated
with multiple conceptual phrases (Schnall, 2014), suggesting
possible variability in the strengths of the associations between
sub-metaphors associated with the core metaphor. Likewise,
individual and cultural differences also influence these associative
strengths and may have an impact on the replicability of findings
(Shalev and Bargh, 2014).
Another structural application of embodied cue integration
is the substitutability relations of cues associated with an
identical mental representation. For example, studies of the
metaphorical links between physical and social temperatures
(e.g., “warm smile,” “cold as ice”) showed that participants
perceive others as “warmer” after they have held a warm rather
than a cold cup of coffee (Williams and Bargh, 2008; IJzerman
and Semin, 2009, 2010; Shalev and Bargh, 2011; Bargh and
Shalev, 2012). Likewise, they experience a room as physically
colder after having been socially rejected (Zhong and Leonardelli,
2008), indicating a possible substitutability between physical and
semantic psychological concepts.
Conclusions
This paper suggests that several constraints based on the
“motivation as cognition” paradigm modulate the interrelations
between perception, emotion and action, and in so doing,
they influence embodied cue integration in both bottom-
up and top-down manners. On the one hand, active goals
influence the feasibility of relevant embodied cues. On the
other hand, the perceiver’s likelihood of drawing a specific
inference may be proportional to the strengths of the associations
between contextual cues and sights and sounds encountered
by the individual (Zaki, 2013). Based on this reasoning,
I suggest that inferences are highly flexible and context-
dependent, and therefore, they vary in accordance with
situational framing effects (Loersch and Payne, 2011; Wiltshire
et al., 2015). As with other psychological phenomena, individual
differences (e.g., physical disability, mental health conditions)
could increase the likelihood that specific motivational states
will be associated with particular embodied cues. Likewise,
the repetition of specific social inferences in response to
similar sensori-motor contextual cues is possible and may
depend on the strength of the association within unique cue
configurations. The contribution of the embodied cue integration
approach goes beyond explaining the variability of findings
across different contexts. By combining cognitive architecture,
semantic metaphoric configurations and structural motivational
properties, embodied cue integration offers a possible path for
integrating different lines of thought in the field of embodied
cognition.
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